Abstract
The widespread existence of weapons presents a threat, to global security as evidenced by the circumstances involving Iran and North Korea. Both countries pursued nuclear policies, leading to regional and global conflict. Rightly needing peace, Iran’s nuclear energy has faced international skepticism, resulting in sanctions and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to Control its Nuclear Activities (JCPOA) but the effectiveness of "the JCPOA remains controversial", worrying Iran to comply according to the law. In contrast, North Korea's nuclear program is growing more military, with many tests of nuclear weapons and missile launches in defiance of UN resolutions. Despite international attempts, including treaties and penalties, North Korea's nuclear development continues to deteriorate, defying global non-proliferation rules. Global security requires better international collaboration, robust verification methods, and long-term transnational solutions.
Key Words
North Korea, Iran, Nuclear Power, Security, UN, War.
Introduction
Nuclear weapons and development of countries not recognized as nuclear-armed nations by the NPT pose a severe challenge to the international security of Iran and North Korea which shows the complexity and geopolitical consequences of nuclear proliferation (Zarate, 2013).
The nuclear program of Iran has long been the object of international concern. Officially, Iranian activities aimed at developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes have raised doubts about possible weapons. The international response, notably the imposition of economic sanctions and the JCPOA negotiations in 2015 aimed at restricting Iran's nuclear capabilities. (Narang, 2015).
North Korea offers a more direct risk to non-proliferation principles. The Republic of Korea (DPRK) has conducted open-ended nuclear tests as well as created ballistic missile technological advances, directly defying UNSC resolutions. North Korea's uranium ambitions are based on a desire for regime safety and global influence, and it has taken a series of aggressive steps and diplomatic contacts. The President Donald Trump meets Kim Jong-(the president). A high degree of conversations between the two have been momentarily prohibited, but this has no meaningful impact on North Korea's nuclear capabilities (Akhtar, 2014 ).
This case study highlights the complex interplay between national security needs, regional stability, and non-proliferation efforts. They emphasize the difficulties of executing international treaties, the limits of diplomacy, and the ongoing danger of nuclear-armed nations outside the existing non-proliferation framework (Bleek, 2014).
Nuclear expansion, technology, and nuclear weapons in nations within the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) pose a threat to security The situations, in Iran and North Korea demonstrate the complexities that arise when nuclear weapons proliferate due, to implications. Iran's nuclear program has long been the object of international concern. Officially, Iranian activities aimed at developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes have raised doubts about possible weapons due to dual-use nuclear technology. In response, the UN, the EU, and the US. imposed severe economic sanctions targeting key sectors of the Iranian economy, especially its oil exports and its financial system, and these sanctions are aimed at forcing Iran to comply with international standards types of non-proliferation weapons to be transparent about its nuclear activities (Gartzke, 2009).
This deal requires Iran to decrease enriched uranium stocks, limit enriched uranium production, and relieve international nuclear exchange restrictions. Extensive review and IAEA approval was required. The JCPOA was seen as a major diplomatic breakthrough, aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons (Cotton, 2005).
However, the effectiveness and sustainability of the JCPOA has been debated
Currently, North Korea is something of a thorn in the side of the non-proliferation process, conducting nuclear tests and developing and producing ballistic missiles are a violation of the UN Security Council's decision. However, North Korea also generally has officials who have worked towards achieving nuclear interests based on regime security and seeking status, thereby causing provocations and nuanced international relations. The program of North Korea emerged in the nineties, but in 2003 it withdrew from the NPT. Since that time, there have been few nuclear tests in North Korea the last of which took place in September 2017. The country has also produced and initiated testing of ICBMs that can target the United States, thus making a shift (Mazarr, 1995).
However, Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un of North Korea in June 2018 and June 2019 stated the hope of making progress on actual denuclearization but remained a pipe dream. However, diplomacy that seemed to have eased current tensions in the region is rendered meaningless by North Korea's efforts to develop and modernize its nuclear arsenal and its missile technology, thus thwarting efforts aimed at maintaining non-proliferation across the globe, and aggravating regional uncertainty (Amir, 2023).
Research Questions
? Who are the primary players and groups engaged in worldwide proliferation policies that support Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs?
? What are the vital diplomatic measures aimed at restraining Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs, and how successful have they been?
? What are the larger global security and regional consequences of Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs?
? What role do security guarantees and diplomacy play in addressing governments' motivations to develop nuclear weapons?
Literature Review
Nuclear weapons and development of countries not recognized as nuclear-armed nations by the NPT pose a severe challenge to the international security of Iran and North Korea which shows the complexity and geopolitical consequences of nuclear proliferation (Zarate, 2013).
The nuclear program of Iran has long been the object of international concern. Officially, Iranian activities aimed at developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes have raised doubts about possible weapons. The international response, notably the imposition of economic sanctions and the JCPOA negotiations in 2015 aimed at restricting Iran's nuclear capabilities. (Narang, 2015).
North Korea offers a more direct risk to non-proliferation principles. The Republic of Korea (DPRK) has conducted open-ended nuclear tests as well as created ballistic missile technological advances, directly defying UNSC resolutions. North Korea's uranium ambitions are based on a desire for regime safety and global influence, and it has taken a series of aggressive steps and diplomatic contacts. The President Donald Trump meets Kim Jong-(the president). A high degree of conversations between the two have been momentarily prohibited, but this has no meaningful impact on North Korea's nuclear capabilities (Akhtar, 2014 ).
This case study highlights the complex interplay between national security needs, regional stability, and non-proliferation efforts. They emphasize the difficulties of executing international treaties, the limits of diplomacy, and the ongoing danger of nuclear-armed nations outside the existing non-proliferation framework (Bleek, 2014).
Nuclear expansion, technology, and nuclear weapons in nations within the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) pose a threat to security The situations, in Iran and North Korea demonstrate the complexities that arise when nuclear weapons proliferate due, to implications. Iran's nuclear program has long been the object of international concern. Officially, Iranian activities aimed at developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes have raised doubts about possible weapons due to dual-use nuclear technology. In response, the UN, the EU, and the US. imposed severe economic sanctions targeting key sectors of the Iranian economy, especially its oil exports and its financial system, and these sanctions are aimed at forcing Iran to comply with international standards types of non-proliferation weapons to be transparent about its nuclear activities (Gartzke, 2009).
This deal requires Iran to decrease enriched uranium stocks, limit enriched uranium production, and relieve international nuclear exchange restrictions. Extensive review and IAEA approval was required. The JCPOA was seen as a major diplomatic breakthrough, aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons (Cotton, 2005).
However, the effectiveness and sustainability of the JCPOA has been debated
Currently, North Korea is something of a thorn in the side of the non-proliferation process, conducting nuclear tests and developing and producing ballistic missiles are a violation of the UN Security Council's decision. However, North Korea also generally has officials who have worked towards achieving nuclear interests based on regime security and seeking status, thereby causing provocations and nuanced international relations. The program of North Korea emerged in the nineties, but in 2003 it withdrew from the NPT. Since that time, there have been few nuclear tests in North Korea the last of which took place in September 2017. The country has also produced and initiated testing of ICBMs that can target the United States, thus making a shift (Mazarr, 1995).
However, Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un of North Korea in June 2018 and June 2019 stated the hope of making progress on actual denuclearization but remained a pipe dream. However, diplomacy that seemed to have eased current tensions in the region is rendered meaningless by North Korea's efforts to develop and modernize its nuclear arsenal and its missile technology, thus thwarting efforts aimed at maintaining non-proliferation across the globe, and aggravating regional uncertainty (Amir, 2023).
Research Questions
? Who are the primary players and groups engaged in worldwide proliferation policies that support Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs?
? What are the vital diplomatic measures aimed at restraining Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs, and how successful have they been?
? What are the larger global security and regional consequences of Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs?
? What role do security guarantees and diplomacy play in addressing governments' motivations to develop nuclear weapons?
Figure 1
The Diplomat, 2020
We need, however, to try to analyze, based on the available data and educated guessing, the North Korean-Iranian relations on arms proliferation with special emphasis on their technical cooperation and potential convergence of their policies. So, information presented by media, and especially in the context of nuclear cooperation, is usually full of assumptions that must be taken with a grain of salt. There is concrete evidence of the relationship between North Korea and the missile technology supply to Iran, thus, it would be relevant to discuss the prospects of cooperation in the sphere of nuclear weapons as well (Kim, 2022).
International U. S. relations are called into question due to nuclear defiance by Iran and North Korea; this essay finds out how the world particularly the Americans should handle these defiant states. The likelihood of the U. S. getting back to the diplomacy of denuclearization could lead North Korea as well as Iran to step up their noncompliance. If these countries are using nuclear defiance to gain legitimacy and cover up for the reduction of their engagement capacity, then improving their engagement capacity might help bring down this defiance and also augur well for the NPT. External actors could play a role in improving both nations' engagement capabilities, potentially impacting U. S. strategies for preventing nuclear proliferation, restarting six-party talks, and initiating new negotiations with Iran (Ogilvie-White, The Defiant States: By pointing out that "No preconditions have been laid down for either North Korea or Iran's nuclear diplomacy" it is argued that both countries are equal players in the international system and that their actions are justifiable (G. N. S. Sorenson, The Nuclear Diplomacy of Iran and North Korea, 2010).
Figure 2
Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead, 2019
One methodology for boosting North Korea or Iran's engagement capability is to endeavor to impact the guidelines and standards that support the worldwide community so that it is more steady with, or less antagonistic to, the philosophies that run the show the governments in Pyongyang & Tehran. This would require an alter by the US and other transaction parties toward China's methodology, which is propelled by a want to deflect administration collapse and limit US and Western impact in universal society (Foster, 2020). To keep dialogs going, the US non-proliferation procedure ought to depend on political use advertised by China, Russia, and select NAM pioneers and eyewitnesses. A multilayered control approach would require critical backing and participation from other governments, especially those developing nations that have restricted US-led non-proliferation endeavors and supported hard-headed administrations.
Iran and Economic Sanctions
Prior to the Iranian rebellion, the United States was Iran's main business partner and second-biggest exporter. The 1979 revolution ended a symbolic alliance between the United States & the Shah, which had previously backed the US's economic and political objectives within the Persian Gulf region. Following the Islamic revolution, Iran was exposed to economic penalties, including the imprisonment of 52 American nationals at the US Embassy in Tehran. The United States has imposed further sanctions on Iran, accusing it of developing nuclear weapons and supporting international terrorism (Arslanian, 2023).
The 1979 financial freeze was a boon for US banks, enabling them to hold onto nearly ten billion dollars in Iranian assets for over a year and reclaim all of the loans they had made to Iran prior to the Shah's abdication. Since 2005, the UN Security Council has placed international sanctions on Iran for the purpose of stopping its nuclear weapons development. Iran faced four waves of penalties in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2010, largely directed at key politicians, government institutions, and enterprises involved with Iran's nuclear program. (Hufbauer, 2020).
Figure 3
Central Bank of Iran, IMF, 2022
Since 2007, the European Union has increasingly increased economic sanctions on Iran, focusing on particular people, Iranian financial institutions, and the purchase and sale of petroleum products to Iran. In 2010, the EU strengthened its sanctions policy to comply with US moves, preventing European institutions from doing transactions with Iranian banks and restricting trade and investment in Iran's energy and transportation sectors (Evans, 2021). In 2012, the EU put an embargo on imports of Iranian crude petroleum goods and crude oil, claiming that the Iranian central bank's resources would be frozen and gold, diamond, and metal trading with Iran would be restricted.
North Korea and Economic Sanctions
The Korean War began in 1950 when North Korea pushed its border from the Soviet Union into the pro-Western Republic of Korea. The US put a boycott on North Korean sends of products, in this way taken after President Truman's address in December 1950, which forced more financial punishments. Since 2006, the United Nations has enacted eight key resolutions imposing and tightening economic sanctions on North Korea for maintaining its nuclear program, dismantling it, rejoining the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, returning to six-party negotiations, and suspending ballistic missile tests. (Smith, 2020).
Figure 4
The Economic Costs of North Korean Nuclear Development, 2013
The EU plays no substantial role in the problem of North Korea's nuclear program, although it does support the Six-Party Talks and the full dismantling of the North Korean nuclear program.
The EU imposed its initial sanctions in 2006 in response to North Korea's nuclear testing. In response to North Korea's nuclear testing in 2006 and 2009, the UN United Nations Security Council issued resolutions condemning multiple launches, restricting the supply of weaponry and related materials, and barring expensive goods, exports, imports, and financial operations (Min, 2020) Resolution 2270, 2321, 2321, and 2375 aim to stifle North Korea's economic sectors that underpin nuclear and ballistic weapon development. These measures are designed to be more comprehensive than any prior UN sanctions regime in the last two decades. North Korea has responded by saying that the sanctions regime constitutes a substantial threat to its sovereignty.
The influence of international networks and technology transfer on the development of nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea
International proliferation initiatives and technical transfers have contributed significantly to the establishment of nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea. These covert agreements permitted the transfer of the equipment, supplies, and know-how required to manufacture atomic bombs. One of the foremost conspicuous figures in these systems is Abdul Qadir Khan, also known as the father of Pakistan's atomic program. Khan wrongfully exchanged atomic innovation with Iran and was provided by North Korea's Khan organization with centrifuge systems and offices to help Tehran improve uranium (Baxter, 2022).
Figure 5
International Atomic Energy, 2022
Similarly, North Korea has used web-based technology to further its nuclear weapons programs. In addition to the missile agreement, the two nations have directly engaged in bilateral collaboration and sought aid from other nuclear powers such as China and Russia to boost their technical capabilities. That technology and this unlawful trade underscore the issue of preventing nuclear proliferation, implying that a. What domestic players and state-sponsored networks may maneuver around international rules to get nuclear power. The international community has fought to break through these discussions and implement non-proliferation treaties, emphasizing the need for strong global collaboration and information sharing in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons technology (Baxter, Mapping the development of North Korea's domestic nuclear research networks, 2022).
Broad implications for international security
The importance of worldwide proliferating agreements and the transfer of technology in Iran's & North Korea's nuclear programs has major consequences for global security. First, the expansion of nuclear power in these countries undermines the goals of global nonproliferation efforts, particularly the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). This non-proliferation strategy raises the danger of nuclear weapons falling into the possession of others, whether via governmental or other actors or being utilized in an attack itself. Second, Iran's and North Korean nuclear programs aggravate regional instability. The nuclear ambitions of North Korea have increased tension on the Korean Peninsula, sparking an arms race and raising the prospect of a military conflict involving major powers like the United States, China, or Japan. In retaliation, they may utilize their nuclear capabilities. (Bleek, Security guarantees and allied nuclear proliferation, 2014 ).
Figure 6
Third, the spread of nuclear technology undermines the faith and credibility of international bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is responsible for monitoring nuclear activities and guaranteeing compliance with non-proliferation treaties (Lee C. M., 2009).
Finally, the longevity of these broad networks demonstrates the limits of conventional views on the role of the state in security. The involvement of non-state actors in the proliferation of nuclear technology emphasizes the need for comprehensive mechanisms such as strengthened international cooperation, improved intelligence sharing, and a given legal framework has made progress towards preventing the transfer of illegal technology. To summarize, the implications of international proliferation policies and technology transfers for Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs are far-reaching, posing significant challenges to global non-proliferation efforts, regional internal stability, and the effectiveness of international security institutions.
Diplomacy and coercion
Diplomacy and pressure are essential tools for addressing concerns of international proliferation and technological transfers to Iran's and North Korea's atomic programs. These strategies aim to stop the manufacturing of nuclear arms and limit their possible use while maintaining global stability. Diplomacy has evolved as the primary method for addressing nuclear proliferation. Iran views the Joint Comprehensive Plans of Action (JCPOA) as a prime instance of international diplomatic efforts to limit Tehran's nuclear capabilities. This multilateral deal on Iran involves the P5+1 (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany. (Martin, 2007). The goal of keeping Iran's nuclear program peaceful in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions is to ensure that, despite occasional challenges and obstacles, agreements like this highlight diplomacy's ability to achieve non-proliferation goals by imposing a ratification and compliance system on the part of the state in question. Similarly, diplomatic efforts with North Korea included conversations such as the Six-Party Talks with North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. These meetings aimed to accomplish denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Shelf. While success is variable, diplomacy remains an important instrument for reducing tensions and achieving peaceful results (Jervis, 2013).
Figure 7
The World Nuclear Industry Status Report, 2023
To enforce compliance with non-proliferation principles, economic penalties have often been employed in conjunction with diplomatic diplomacy. Sanctions may impose enormous economic pressure on governments developing nuclear weapons, increasing the price of such projects beyond their apparent advantages. For example, the imposition of global sanctions on Iran directed at its exports of oil and economy resulted in economic restrictions, forcing Tehran to the negotiating table. North Korea faced extensive sanctions aimed at reducing the assets and technology necessary for its peaceful nuclear and missile programs (Akhtar, 2014)
Enforcement of international agreements
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are critical to avoiding nuclear proliferation and ensuring global security. The NPT seeks to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation, promote the elimination of arms, and allow peaceful nuclear energy usage. However, disobedience by countries like as Iran and North Korea has exposed faults in the existing system. The international community has used other enforcement instruments, including resolutions of the UN Security Council and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. These agreements have severe verification mechanisms, such as regular IAEA inspections and sanctions (Dupont, 2013 ).
Figure 8
The cumulative number of individuals and entities listed in sanctions regimes
International cooperation is critical for effective oversight, with international activities like sharing data and coordinated sanctions boosting the ability to detect and respond to violations. Initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) enable member states to restrict the movement of proliferation-related commodities and the supply of unlawful goods. Enforcement entails addressing the root causes of the propagate, providing security assurances, settling regional issues, and using diplomacy, financial incentives, and global engagement (DeFrancia, 2012).
To summarize, the implementation of international agreements is critical for avoiding nuclear proliferation and maintaining global security. Additional procedures, such as resolutions passed by the international coordination, and addressing underlying security issues, are needed to assure excellent compliance.
Policy Recommendations
? Enhance cooperation between major powers, regional stakeholders, and international organizations to develop an integrated strategy for dealing with nuclear proliferation, strengthening existing UNSC and IAEA strategies.
? The support for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is crucial for universal compliance, ensuring verification mechanisms to prevent nuclear testing and prevent further technological advancement.
? Supporting CTBT is vital for ensuring universal compliance, preventing nuclear testing, and advancing technology.
? Focus on international efforts to resolve regional disputes and security issues, promoting regional stability via discussion and conflict resolution in hostile circumstances.
? Collaborate with international partners to strengthen border controls and prevent the smuggling of nuclear materials and technology.
Conclusion
Iran and North Korea's nuclear initiatives, which are being built via international proliferation treaties and technical transfers, pose serious challenges to global security. These covert acts undermine non-proliferation efforts, exacerbate regional tensions, and reveal flaws in the implementation of international agreements. Diplomacy and force, such as financial penalties and military restrictions, are critical weapons for addressing these challenges. The successful implementation of agreements like as the NPT, aided by the IAEA's prudent efforts and the cooperation of international organizations like the UNSC, is critical to limiting proliferation while also devouring its causes. Address the root causes of arms proliferation by strengthening diplomacy, economic incentives, and regional dispute resolution, all while maintaining international conflict security. And to ensure that the global community stays informed, cooperative, and adaptable.
References
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Akhtar, S., & Khan, Z. (2014). Understanding the nuclear aspirations and behavior of North Korea and Iran. Strategic Analysis, 38(5), 617–633. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.941211
- Amir, M. (2023). Us Counter Proliferation Efforts: A Comparative Study of Iran and North Korea. Social Sciences Spectrum. 71-88.
- Arslanian, F. (2023). The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Case of Iran (2005-15). The International Spectator, 58(4), 16–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2023.2228679
- Baxter, P., Hastings, J. V., Kim, P., & Yim, M. (2021). Mapping the development of North Korea’s domestic nuclear research networks. Review of Policy Research, 39(2), 219–246. https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12462
- Bleek, P. C., & Lorber, E. B. (2013). Security guarantees and allied nuclear proliferation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(3), 429–454. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713509050
- Brewer, E. (2021). The nuclear proliferation landscape: Is past prologue? The Washington Quarterly, 44(2), 181–197. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2021.1934250
- Cotton, J. (2005). The Proliferation Security Initiative and North Korea: Legality and limitations of a coalition strategy. Security Dialogue, 36(2), 193–211. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010605054648
- DeFrancia, C. (2012). Enforcing the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the legality of preventive measures. Vand. J. Transnat'l L, 705.
- Dupont, P. (2013). Compliance with Treaties in the Context of Nuclear Non-proliferation: Assessing Claims in the Case of Iran. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 19(2), 161–210. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krt017
- Evans, C. P. (2021). Going, Going, Gone? Assessing Iran’s Possible Grounds for Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 26(2), 309–345. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krab001
- Fitzpatrick, M. (2006). Iran and North Korea: The proliferation Nexus. Survival, 48(1), 61–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330600594264
- Foster, B. D. (2020). US FOREIGN POLICY IN RELATION TO NORTH KOREA (Doctoral dissertation, Monterey. CA: Naval Postgraduate School. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1114526.pdf
- Gartzke, E., & Kroenig, M. (2009). A strategic approach to nuclear proliferation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(2), 151–160. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002708330039
- Hufbauer, G. C., & Jung, E. (2020). What’s new in economic sanctions? European Economic Review, 130, 103572. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103572
- Jervis, R. (2013). Getting to Yes with Iran: The Challenges of Coercive Diplomacy on JSTOR. www.jstor.org. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41721008
- Kampani, G. (2002). Second tier proliferation: The case of Pakistan and North Korea. The Nonproliferation Review, 9(3), 107–116. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700208436907
- Kim, P., Kim, J., & Yim, M. (2022). Assessing proliferation uncertainty in civilian nuclear cooperation under new power dynamics of the international nuclear trade. Energy Policy, 163, 112852. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2022.112852
- Lee, C. M. (2009). The Evolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Implications for Iran. The Institute Francis des Relations Internationales (IFRI), 20-38. https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/proliferation-papers/evolution-north-korean-nuclear-crisis-implications
- Lee, H. (2024). Analysis and prospect of DPRK nuclear issue based on “Strategic logic of nuclear proliferation.” Defense and Security Analysis, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2024.2318916
- Martin, C. H. (2007). “GOOD COP/BAD COP” AS a MODEL FOR NONPROLIFERATION DIPLOMACY TOWARD NORTH KOREA AND IRAN. The Nonproliferation Review, 14(1), 61–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700601178473
- Mazarr, M. J. (1995). Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea. International Security, 20(2), 92. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539230
- Min, W., & Han, S. (2020). Economic sanctions against North Korea: The pivotal role of US–China cooperation. International Area Studies Review, 23(2), 177–193. https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865920901896
- Narang, V. (2015). Nuclear strategies of emerging nuclear powers: North Korea and Iran. The Washington Quarterly, 38(1), 73–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2015.1038175
- Ogilvie-White, T. (2010). THE DEFIANT STATES. The Nonproliferation Review, 17(1), 115–138. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700903484702
- Smith, H. (2020). The ethics of United Nations sanctions on North Korea: effectiveness, necessity and proportionality. Critical Asian Studies, 52(2), 182–203. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2020.1757479
- Sobecki, N. K. (2024). Negotiating regional order: regional power influences on nuclear nonproliferation in East Asia. International Politics, 125-144.
- Vaddi, S. (2024). The Treaty of Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in North Korea’s denuclearization process: Implications for Northeast Asia. Peace Review, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2024.2343028
- Zarate, R. (2013). The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence in the Cases of Iran and North Korea. Korea Observer, 411-41.
-
Akhtar, S., & Khan, Z. (2014). Understanding the nuclear aspirations and behavior of North Korea and Iran. Strategic Analysis, 38(5), 617–633. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.941211
- Amir, M. (2023). Us Counter Proliferation Efforts: A Comparative Study of Iran and North Korea. Social Sciences Spectrum. 71-88.
- Arslanian, F. (2023). The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Case of Iran (2005-15). The International Spectator, 58(4), 16–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2023.2228679
- Baxter, P., Hastings, J. V., Kim, P., & Yim, M. (2021). Mapping the development of North Korea’s domestic nuclear research networks. Review of Policy Research, 39(2), 219–246. https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12462
- Bleek, P. C., & Lorber, E. B. (2013). Security guarantees and allied nuclear proliferation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58(3), 429–454. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713509050
- Brewer, E. (2021). The nuclear proliferation landscape: Is past prologue? The Washington Quarterly, 44(2), 181–197. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2021.1934250
- Cotton, J. (2005). The Proliferation Security Initiative and North Korea: Legality and limitations of a coalition strategy. Security Dialogue, 36(2), 193–211. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010605054648
- DeFrancia, C. (2012). Enforcing the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the legality of preventive measures. Vand. J. Transnat'l L, 705.
- Dupont, P. (2013). Compliance with Treaties in the Context of Nuclear Non-proliferation: Assessing Claims in the Case of Iran. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 19(2), 161–210. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krt017
- Evans, C. P. (2021). Going, Going, Gone? Assessing Iran’s Possible Grounds for Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 26(2), 309–345. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krab001
- Fitzpatrick, M. (2006). Iran and North Korea: The proliferation Nexus. Survival, 48(1), 61–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330600594264
- Foster, B. D. (2020). US FOREIGN POLICY IN RELATION TO NORTH KOREA (Doctoral dissertation, Monterey. CA: Naval Postgraduate School. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1114526.pdf
- Gartzke, E., & Kroenig, M. (2009). A strategic approach to nuclear proliferation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(2), 151–160. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002708330039
- Hufbauer, G. C., & Jung, E. (2020). What’s new in economic sanctions? European Economic Review, 130, 103572. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103572
- Jervis, R. (2013). Getting to Yes with Iran: The Challenges of Coercive Diplomacy on JSTOR. www.jstor.org. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41721008
- Kampani, G. (2002). Second tier proliferation: The case of Pakistan and North Korea. The Nonproliferation Review, 9(3), 107–116. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700208436907
- Kim, P., Kim, J., & Yim, M. (2022). Assessing proliferation uncertainty in civilian nuclear cooperation under new power dynamics of the international nuclear trade. Energy Policy, 163, 112852. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2022.112852
- Lee, C. M. (2009). The Evolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Implications for Iran. The Institute Francis des Relations Internationales (IFRI), 20-38. https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/proliferation-papers/evolution-north-korean-nuclear-crisis-implications
- Lee, H. (2024). Analysis and prospect of DPRK nuclear issue based on “Strategic logic of nuclear proliferation.” Defense and Security Analysis, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2024.2318916
- Martin, C. H. (2007). “GOOD COP/BAD COP” AS a MODEL FOR NONPROLIFERATION DIPLOMACY TOWARD NORTH KOREA AND IRAN. The Nonproliferation Review, 14(1), 61–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700601178473
- Mazarr, M. J. (1995). Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea. International Security, 20(2), 92. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539230
- Min, W., & Han, S. (2020). Economic sanctions against North Korea: The pivotal role of US–China cooperation. International Area Studies Review, 23(2), 177–193. https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865920901896
- Narang, V. (2015). Nuclear strategies of emerging nuclear powers: North Korea and Iran. The Washington Quarterly, 38(1), 73–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2015.1038175
- Ogilvie-White, T. (2010). THE DEFIANT STATES. The Nonproliferation Review, 17(1), 115–138. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700903484702
- Smith, H. (2020). The ethics of United Nations sanctions on North Korea: effectiveness, necessity and proportionality. Critical Asian Studies, 52(2), 182–203. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2020.1757479
- Sobecki, N. K. (2024). Negotiating regional order: regional power influences on nuclear nonproliferation in East Asia. International Politics, 125-144.
- Vaddi, S. (2024). The Treaty of Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in North Korea’s denuclearization process: Implications for Northeast Asia. Peace Review, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2024.2343028
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Cite this article
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APA : Jan, W., Khan, M. F., & Farooq, N. (2024). Nuclear Proliferation and International Security Case Studies of Iran and North Korea. Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, IX(III), 12-23. https://doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2024(IX-III).02
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CHICAGO : Jan, Waheed, Muhammad Fahim Khan, and Naila Farooq. 2024. "Nuclear Proliferation and International Security Case Studies of Iran and North Korea." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, IX (III): 12-23 doi: 10.31703/gsssr.2024(IX-III).02
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HARVARD : JAN, W., KHAN, M. F. & FAROOQ, N. 2024. Nuclear Proliferation and International Security Case Studies of Iran and North Korea. Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, IX, 12-23.
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MHRA : Jan, Waheed, Muhammad Fahim Khan, and Naila Farooq. 2024. "Nuclear Proliferation and International Security Case Studies of Iran and North Korea." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, IX: 12-23
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MLA : Jan, Waheed, Muhammad Fahim Khan, and Naila Farooq. "Nuclear Proliferation and International Security Case Studies of Iran and North Korea." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, IX.III (2024): 12-23 Print.
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OXFORD : Jan, Waheed, Khan, Muhammad Fahim, and Farooq, Naila (2024), "Nuclear Proliferation and International Security Case Studies of Iran and North Korea", Global Strategic & Security Studies Review, IX (III), 12-23
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TURABIAN : Jan, Waheed, Muhammad Fahim Khan, and Naila Farooq. "Nuclear Proliferation and International Security Case Studies of Iran and North Korea." Global Strategic & Security Studies Review IX, no. III (2024): 12-23. https://doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2024(IX-III).02