Abstract

This article offers a strategy that explores the idea of a Hybrid World War and how it can be applied to the current military struggle between China and the US. The global capitalist system, which arose as a worldwide framework for production, trade, and finance between the 16th and 18th centuries, is factored into the Hybrid World War concept in a way that the new-fangled Cold War was not. In addition to analyzing China's ascent and its global repercussions, this research work also focuses on how the current crisis in the unipolar global order has paved the way for strategic competition between China and US. This theoretical stance provides a new lens through which the US-China rivalry can be examined from several angles beyond conventional rivalry. We can understand the complexities of the ongoing battle between these two global powers by using the Hybrid World War paradigm, which investigates these dimensions. 

Key Words

US, China, Hybrid World War, New Cold War

Introduction

The media and many Western analysts began talking about a "New Cold War" after the ongoing crises in Ukraine, and Syria, and increasing tension in the Asia-Pacific region area as Chinese influence has grown across the world since the years 2013 and 2014. This idea, bolstered by Woo's (2015) research, ascends in the context of escalating conflicts between the US and its Western allies (also known as Global North), this also includes emerging powers of the Global South, primarily led by China and Russia. There are four primary qualms that form the foundation of a "New Cold War", they include:

A) Emergence (or reemergence) of new powers”

B) Unipolar "liberal" world order's crisis, which is being posed by the emergence of new powers

C) There has been a change in the mechanism of governance at the global level, it is mainly due to the economic crisis of 2008–2009 that had adverse implications for the Global North. After the advent of nuclear weapons the idea that mutually assured destruction deters conventional wars between great powers, WWI and WWII during the period of "systemic chaos" between 1914 and 1945, is shared by the "New Cold War"  (Brands & Gaddis, 2021, p. 101).”




The Russia-China Axis

The New Cold War and America's Leadership Crisis, written by Schoen and Kaylan in 2014, was one of the first ground-breaking magazines that carried out research on this subject worldwide. They are neocons who work for The Wall Street Journal to paraphrase what the writers of the essay claim that the US must build a strong defence system and stresses its national interests to maintain its role as the only superpower at the global level (Schoen & Kaylan, 2014, p. 22).

Similarly, at least rhetorically, several well-known Russian writers start to exploit this theme in their works. Dmitri Trenin wrote an essay titled "Welcome to Cold War II," in which he speculated that, in light of the new situation that evolved with the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, the time after the Cold War must be considered as an era labelled as Inter-Cold War (Trenin, 2014, p. 55).

Second, prominent thinker Sergey Karaganov explains that the current era is the era of the Cold War Second or "New Cold War". This era features the struggle between West and non-West that can be seen in many shapes such as BRICS and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Karaganov, 2018, p. 99).

Chinese President Xi Jinping has often urged his Western counterparts to abandon their Cold War attitude (A.P. News, 2022). In this context, however, the notion that the new Cold War is being utilized for attacking the mindset or discourses that legitimate US foreign policy against China rather than to examine a global geopolitical situation. Both Zhao & Dan, (2019) and Zhao (2019) provide examples of Chinese intellectuals and academicians taking a critical look at the Cold War mindset and actions of the US (Zhao & Dan, 2019, p. 20).

According to Merino (2016), a significant geopolitical shift occurred between 2013 and 2014, ushering new conflicts in the unipolar globalist world system presided over by the US. Instead of words like "Hybrid World War" or "Hybrid and Fragmented World War," the concept of a "New Cold War" (Merino, 2020, p. 71) describes the rising political and strategic tensions between developing states and the dominant power pole. This framework considers the unique features of China's rise and its global significance, setting it apart from the Soviet Union's role, as well as the characteristics of the global capitalist system during the 1970s and 1980s and strategic competition during unipolar globalist order and various crisis taking place (Merino, 2020, p. 71).

It is interesting to note how the concept of a hybrid war and its application over Sino-US confrontations (1999) has entered a stage of "systemic disorder" characteristic of transformative conflicts lasting around three decades. In this context, two significant trends are at play: first, the gradual decline in Anglo-American power and the Western world in comparison to the rise of China and Asia. Second, the growing political and strategic contradictions between the leading powerful states of the unipolar world order with the emerging powers that seek to establish a new bipolar world order (Bader, 2018, p. 101).

Hybrid World War

In the last few years, the notion of Hybrid Warfare has arisen, synthesizing new approaches to waging military conflict. In other words, "warfare," rather than "war," is a state of conflict between two groups. Hoffman, writing in one of the first works on the topic highlights new global realism that the United States must confront as a result of the proliferation of sophisticated technology, the spread of globalization, violent transnational extremists, and growing corridors of powers (Patel & Erickson, 2022, p. 2). Hoffman argues that the diverse nature of the contemporary battle is the most defining feature of the evolution of war in the modern era. Hybrid warfare represents not a proliferation of new threats but rather the confluence of existing ones (Castiel, 2022, p. 38). China's cyber warfare harms the United States because it is an integral part of the country's hybrid strategy of war worry over China's strategic goals. Cyber warfare, as defined by Dannreuther, "is the transformation of the metaphorical place in which machine-mediated communications occur' into a space of fight." (Roland, 2017, p. 2) Understanding that cyberspace is "an electronic equivalent of a physical battlefield," China established a "Cyber Warfare" division of the army in 2015 (Liu, 2019, p.1).

The Cyberspace Administration of China was also founded under President Xi's watch, aiming to improve cyber security, regulate online material, and grow China's digital economy. Furthermore, China is rushing to incorporate Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) and quantum computing developments into future military operations. China is specifically looking for using quantum computing to assist its spy agencies in cracking the most secure encryption systems and autonomous drone swarms to defend against cyber-attacks (Adam, 2018).

When it comes to international law and ethical norms, according to Allison, "the Chinese strategy is unconstrained by any meaningful requirement to defend Chinese action in war and peace." (Letwin, 2021) In sum, Chinese officials may need to be more malleable in their quest for security in reaction to the current security crisis. Since there is no "feeling of fair play" or similarity with the laws of traditional conflict, such a mindset is perfectly suited to cyber warfare (Wheeler, 2011).

There has been a noticeable uptick in the complexity of Chinese government cyber-attacks on the United States during the past few years. According to Denning (2017), it is likely that Chinese patriot hackers were responsible for these assaults as a form of vengeance for US actions, an example can be given of the bombardment of the Chinese embassy during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 and the accident that involved a US military jet and a Chinese fighter plane in 2001. During the "Titan Rain" cyber-attack campaign in 2003, Chinese hackers stole critical information from American government agencies and its Department of Defense (Denning, 2017, p. 27).

Due mainly to continuous maritime disputes, the Indo-Pacific area has become the most targeted region in the world for cyber-attacks (Nilanthan, 2016). CrowdStrike, a U.S. cyber security company, has likewise concluded that China is to blame for many cyber-attacks launched against American networks in the first half of this year (Staff, 2018). In light of these occurrences, China has accused the US of being a "cyber-predator" that violates the rights and interests of other countries (Staff, 2018).

China's cyber warfare operations are a significant factor in the current security dilemma and a vital fragment of its hybrid warfare strategy. When security is thought to be achieved only through expansion, the security dilemma becomes more acute, as predicted by Jervis's (1978) theory of offensive-defensive equilibrium. China's military operations and preparations, including the development of cyber weapons, are seen as more than defensive measures by the United States, which is why the US established the cyber division in 2009 of its Cyber Strategic Command (Corn, 2010, p. 5).

After the Pacific Pivot was announced in 2011, the United States detained five Chinese army officials in 2014 on allegations of industrial espionage. Because of these occurrences, China and the United States signed an agreement on commercial intelligence in 2015. The United States military is likewise quite worried about the sophisticated cyber-attacks launched on American infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Defense has threatened hackers, saying, "If you bring down our power infrastructure, maybe we'll throw a missile down one of your smokestacks." (Dannreuther, 2014, p. 23). As a result, if China continues to escalate its cyber warfare, it might spark a full-scale military clash between the two superpowers. The next section will discuss how China improves its hybrid warfare skills to provide safety in a dangerous world.

Anand (1999) describes this new kind of warfare as a war that does not need force and military armament to destroy the adversary rather in this type of warfare, information is used to damage the enemy completely.

Salgado (2020) analyses the South American area using this approach and notes how the United States has used Hybrid Warfare tactics to retake strategic and political dominance in the twenty-first century (Salgado, 2020, p. 1). To counter this, Romano and Tirado (2018) highlight lawfare as a component of Hybrid Warfare.

Every innovation in modern warfare is tied to broader structural changes in the international system. As Mackinder (1904) noted, the "post-Columbian" age in the early 20th century saw the growth of capitalism and the Western world system, with this a closed political system also emerged. The strategic rivalry between great powers converted from territorial expansion to relative efficiency in governance. Contemporary capitalism necessitates a continuous fight in which relative surplus value is the key and the search for this value causes a perpetual revolution in the state of knowledge, technology, and the structure of society (Tsygankov, Tsygankov, & Gonzales, 2021, p. 145).”

The term "Hybrid Warfare" has recently become the preferred mode of conflict resolution in a modern globalized world. The conventional distribution of power has shifted as a result of the trans nationalization of capital which is controlled by Global North and its financial networks, the creation of a worldwide production system, and the growth of firms and other players that operate on a global scale. The military instruments have now been replaced by the hybrid war which is a combination of information, politics and military (Evstafiev & Manoilo, 2021).” When measured against time, space was drastically reduced, if not eliminated. This was also reflected on strategic and political fronts. The American hegemonic position, and the global multilateral institutions it developed as part of that role, constituted a sea change like the international system, expanding the breadth and depth of global interconnection to unprecedented dimensions. This tendency got more prominent throughout the 1990s when globalism was at its height, and Anglo-American finance capital dominated the worldwide financial markets. It is helpful to think of globalism as a transnational political force and goal born in the core of Anglo-American relations but now has a reach well beyond that region. The movement of information, money, and goods still mediates the interstate system even if the global system has no exteriority. The dissolution of the Soviet Union allowed for a more "closed" political environment within which the interstate system might develop. The international and global systems were intertwined with the Soviet economy and the countries under its sway (Flint & Taylor, 2018, p. 31).

In spite of this, they assimilated from a semi-peripheral position with minimal relative dependence on the capitalist world. Identifiable groups worked together to establish a primarily polarised hierarchy. The current situation is very different. China's role in the global economy is qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from the Soviet Union's. China is all the time more invested in global command operations and is no longer just the sizeable industrial workshop of the world economy. “Thus, in today's interconnected world, competition and cooperation in value production coexist (Gassama, Ebrahimi, & Yusoff, 2017, p. 10).”

People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China has issued a 2019 white paper titled "The World in 2019," which supports this evaluation of the present world's historical and geographical condition (China, 2019). In a world where everyone's interests and safety are intertwined, a shared future is not just a hope or something to look forward to; it is a historical fact that is almost always imposed. As seen by recent events, strategic rivalry on a global scale is increasing. As a result, the US has implemented unilateral measures by changing its military plans and overall national security. We cannot rule out the possibility of even more sad outcomes if this process continues to grow and the intensity of conflict increases at every level (China, 2019).

This brings us to the next step: knowing that a war is going on and looking at new ways of fighting is essential. This historical event has become a mix of conflict and cooperation, with the conflict highlighting collaboration, which still exists as a relationship of need and interdependence.

Since their normalization in the 1970s, the relationship between China and America has been complex, there has been a combination of collaboration and competition, as claimed by Zhao and Dan (2019). This article, however, claims that Hybrid World War has been raging since 2014 and is only growing more destructive. The crisis of American hegemony and the advent of systemic chaos are the core causes of this escalation, pushed by the rapid acceleration of numerous processes in the current historical-spatial conversion of the world system (Zhao & Dan, 2019, p. 20).

The global struggle between the established core powers and the rising forces of periphery and semi-periphery (Merino G. E., 2022, p. 114) and the regional conflicts emerging in different regions are the trigger events for this Hybrid World War. Territorial and resource control disputes drive wars in the South China Sea, Afghanistan, and Syria. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is also an example of several similar political and economic efforts that are becoming increasingly competitive at global and regional levels.

Since 2014, the world's leading nations have been actively involved in battles—albeit unconventional wars—in strategic regions. Military escalations and confrontations on several fronts are becoming increasingly problematic for the central powers (Zhao & Dan, 2019, p. 20). It underlines the escalating tensions and conflicts in the Hybrid World War, in which multiple entities compete for influence and control over strategically important regions.

In an interview, on June 2014, with La Vanguardia, Pope Francis warned that the Third World War was already underway. We may learn a lot about how significant players and institutions are processing the new global geopolitical reality by rescuing his perspective. He pointed out that the present economic system is not sustainable and zonal wars would be waged instead of World War III (The Catholic World Report, 2014)

This paragraph may find key concepts for understanding the present international war. The first is that because a traditional global war is impossible (due to the prevalence of the idea of mutually assured destruction), the fight is fought out in discrete territories, seeming as pieces of a larger global structural struggle. The second main point of this paragraph is that conflict is caused by the current international system, which "is no longer viable" and "throws away an entire generation." This is linked to the end of Anglo-American hegemony. The third idea is the link between the economy's problems, the needs of the empire, and the weaponry trade's vested interests. In this way, the Military-Industrial Complexes (MICs) of the US and other large states are at the centre of production and innovation infrastructures. The Military Industrial Complex (MIC) is an integral segment of the incredible power of the Global North's economy, which was predicated to have a budget of across $778 billion in 2021 (i.e. 40% of the global total) and will use this money to support private enterprises and fund technological advancement. Add to this the separate funds for military conflicts and covert activities.

It can presumably be said that the Hybrid World War (HWW) or Hybrid and Fragmented World War could be identified as a war that would be a combination of conventional and non-conventional elements and strategies. This conflict is between those who support the existing unipolar globalist system and those who want a new multipolar order. The United States and Russia, the world's two most powerful countries, are involved. The competition between great powers is growing in many ways, i.e. it is overspread to the fields of economy, politics, and technology. Psychological warfare, financial warfare, commercial warfare, currency warfare, economic warfare, cyber warfare, information warfare, biological warfare, judicial warfare or lawfare and cognitive action are all used to describe this phenomenon. The distinction between civilian and military, between the beginning and the conclusion, and between the private and the public all become hazy in a Hybrid War.”

Sino-US Rivalry: Unipolar and Multipolar Worldviews

The escalation of several more hostile political and strategic confrontations is one of the global system's historical-spatial transition patterns. The rise of South and China and the decline of the Global North and Anglo-America are very important to study to understand the Hybrid World War. The global transitions of 1999-2001 compelled the US to frame China as a "strategic competitor" instead of a "strategic partner of the 21st Century" during the era of George W. Bush. The neoconservative point of view was imposed on geo-strategy, as stated in the Project for a New American Century, to protect American hegemony and prevent the development of prospective challengers in Europe, the centre of Eurasia, and Asia. This bigger plan to increase influence in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf was manifested in the Iraq War and the "Global War on Terrorism" (GWOT). 

The US-led wars and those supported by its allies were reactions to significant developments that threatened the stability of the unipolar world order. In 2001, with the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 2001, cooperation in Eurasia between Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and China started. In the year 2000 "Go Out Policy" was implemented by China for encouraging external investment by state-owned entities. The "Dot-Com" crisis, which followed the bursting of the technological bubble and had a significant effect on the Northern Hemisphere, is illustrative of the inherent instability of neoliberal financialization, and these developments underline that fragility.

The 2008 global financial crisis only further highlighted the established order's precarious nature. In 2009, developing industrial and regional powerhouses Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa formulated BRICS organizations to address these concerns and democratize global wealth and power. China's nominal GDP has increased by a factor of four between 2008 and 2021, which is not surprising given the correlation between economic growth and political clout. China's expanding economic and political status has given it the confidence to challenge the institutions of geopolitical reliance and subordination. Changes to American geostrategic goals might be expected after Barack Obama became the President. When confronted with the BRICS's developing powers, the Obama administration decided to use a containment policy, tightening its grip on the periphery of Eurasia and bolstering its focus on the Asia-Pacific region. NATO's expansion in the West extended towards Russia's frontiers (particularly with Ukraine), and the alliance backed the EU's enlargement and the TTP plan. The advancement of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the formation of an Indo-Pacific NATO under the leadership of Australia, India, and Japan were both parts of this globalist geostrategic vision for the Asia-Pacific region. The New Silk Road, with Afghanistan serving as its hub, was also called for by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011; this was followed by a more substantial military operation that included the deployment of 100,000 more American soldiers. This policy, which included relocating American air and naval assets to the Pacific to raise pressure on China from that area, was part of President Obama's 2012 "Pivot to Asia" declaration. Hillary Clinton stated the primary justifications for a shift in the foreign policy of the US, she predicted before becoming the secretary of state that international politics would advance towards Asia and the Pacific and that the US should be at the centre of upcoming change (Clinton, 2011). The claimed objectives of the plan were to dominate Eurasia by containing and encircling both Russia and China on the one hand and imposing the rules of capitalism in the 21st century on the other hand. President Obama summed up the geostrategic justification for the TPP by saying, that America cannot allow China to set the global economy rules while over 95 per cent of American potential consumers live outside the US borders. So, the US should take the lead in the formation of regulations, which would allow American goods to enter new markets while also protecting the rights and environment of workers. Former Defense Secretary Ash Carter has said that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is just as necessary for U.S. security interests in Asia as the deployment of an extra aircraft carrier. He also noted that the TPP is the key to a power shift towards Asia in favour of the US.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was created to strike a middle ground between the region's competing geopolitical and economic-political goals. It established a firm connection between the two factors. According to Green and Goodman (2015), in the Asia-Pacific area, which is well-known for its economic activity and the impact of business on law and authority, the TPP reinforced a liberal American perspective on the game's rules.

Beijing has been drawn towards a Sino-centric worldview as the economic power has transferred from the US and Japan to China (Green & Goodman, 2015, p. 30). As an effort to contain China's power through the fortification of key political relationships, the TPP was viewed as having far-reaching geopolitical ramifications. In doing so, it aimed to defend the political and economic autonomy of nations like the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan from growing too dependent on China. U.S. national security interests were thought to be served by Japan's and Australia's backing of Taiwan's membership in the TPP.

Despite efforts to restrict China's rise and intensify geopolitical conflict, there is a growing sense of interconnectedness. As a result of the rapid expansion of trade between the two countries between 2008 and 2021, China is likely to overtake the US as the state's primary source of imports (Hoffman, 2016, p. 29).

The geopolitical scene was significantly altered in 2014 by Russia's annexation of Crimea and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) formation. China's backing reinforced the SCO, and the EAEU's and BRI's relationship was enhanced. The West saw the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a political power in Eurasia that was at odds with NATO. The SCO gained more influence in global affairs after welcoming India, Pakistan, and Iran as members in 2015.

Through the development of trade channels, China's Belt and Road Initiative, backed by several countries, planned to relocate the centre of economic activity from the Atlantic to the Eurasian continent (Kissinger, 2017). New regional and global organizations, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Chinese State Bank, arose due to this shift towards multipolar multilateralism. In addition, China and Russia have stepped up their cooperation in reaction to the "Empire of the Sea," a group of Western maritime powers led by the United States (Zheng, 2021, p. 190).

Since 2014, the US and the geopolitical West have responded strongly to these changes. Donbas, Ukraine, exemplifies the collision between the new institutions of a shifting global power map and the old international order built under American hegemony, which resulted in a hybrid global conflict. Significant strategic voids exist between the United States and its old allies, NATO, China, and Russia. More importantly, in a largely multipolar world, the neoliberal globalization crisis driven by the Global North is at odds with the rapid globalization led by China and other rising countries.

Asia-Pacific Dispute

The United States has always prioritized the Asia-Pacific area because of the widespread belief that the rise of China or an anti-hegemonic alliance as a global superpower would threaten American hegemony. Strategic superiority in the region is something both the United States and Japan want to keep (Er?en, 2014, p. 185). However, as the globe becomes more multipolar, the balance of power has shifted, with China playing a crucial role and international institutions and programs increasingly aligning with its influence.

U.S. political and strategic leadership in the region includes securing two interconnected networks of military stations and facilities bordering China. These groups of islands form barriers to the Pacific's interior, hence the name "island chains" (Scott, 2012, p. 609). Taiwan is a vital outpost for the United States against China in this chain. Disputes have arisen over areas like the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea due to China's rise and subsequent expansion beyond these island chains. If China were to gain dominance in these regions, it might use them to weaken Taiwan's position in the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea. China's strategy for the South China Sea includes expanding its navy and missile forces, researching and developing hypersonic technology, and erecting artificial islands in the Paracels and the Spratly Archipelago (Nansha) to house military sites (China, 2019). The South China Sea is pivotal to regional dynamics because of the strategic importance of its straits and naval ports, such as the Strait of Malacca and the United States naval station in Singapore.

Because it traverses the most active region of the world, which accounts for a disproportionate amount of global output and trade, the sea trade routes encircling the region are crucial. China's regional leadership position has been bolstered by implementing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in the first month of 2022. China's military might have also increased, threatening American hegemony in Asia. U.S. interests in the Western Pacific are in danger, according to the American Congressional Research Service, because of the expanding naval capability of China and Russia (Sweeney, 2020). As hypersonic weapons, cyber warfare, and technologies like AI and Industry 4.0 have advanced, the United States military budget of about $778 billion has remained relatively stable. China's military expenditure has climbed significantly to approximately $252 billion.

Spending on the military in China has increased alongside its GDP, helping it become a leader in cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, and industrialized conflict. As a result, there has been a change in the regional military balance of power, forcing the United States to reevaluate its position and adjust its tactics accordingly (Ghobakhloo, 2020, p. 11).

Investment in AI-related projects by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) dates back to 2020. Examples of such uses are social network analysis, war game practice, and machine learning to provide tactical guidance. In 2021, the US Department of Defence published a paper highlighting China's focus on artificial intelligence and its ambitions to use it to influence rivals and gain control over other important technologies with military implications. Among these include quantum computing, data science, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and innovative manufacturing materials. China plans to improve its military might by using more "computerized and intelligent" systems. There is already an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, and in June 2020, the Chinese government indicated that it would do the same in the South China Sea.

Chinese media in April 2020 also reported that the government has plans to expand Sansha City on Hainan Island by two more districts. In response to these events, the United States sent two aircraft carriers to the region in July 2020. The United States is now officially on the side of Vietnam and the Philippines in territorial disputes (Sayler, 2020), abandoning its former position of neutrality. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that China's bullying methods in the South China Sea to gain control of offshore resources were unacceptable. The United States and its allies argue that China does not have a maritime empire in the South China Sea. The United States' status as a regional arbitrator may also be weakened due to this alignment (Zeng, 2020, p. 99).

Conflicts over sovereignty claims and marine rights have escalated since 2010 when the United States became more active in extraterritorial activities. A few years ago, Japan, a key US ally in the region, reinterpreted its "Peace Constitution" to allow overseas military actions to protect allies even when not directly attacked. As a result of this policy shift, Japan is becoming closer to the Western world and the Northern Hemisphere in general and has even signed free trade agreements with the European Union (in 2019) and the United Kingdom (in 2021).

The United States, Japan, India, and Australia have formed a security dialogue known as QUAD to oppose China's growing influence. In China's eyes, QUAD is Asia's answer to NATO. In response to China's expanding economic and military dominance, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe began the discussion in 2007, and the Trump administration restarted it in November 2017. It might pave the way for an Indo-Pacific NATO to be established. 

India's position has complicated recent endeavours by the Quad to further Western interests. India has cut connections with the West and bolstered commercial ties with Russia in response to the Ukraine crisis and the rising economic confrontation between the West and Russia as a result of sanctions. It is based on India's concept of "strategic autonomy" and "strategic balance." India joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2016, despite declining invitations to join the BRI and the RCEP. The country was already juggling several competing interests. Despite serious territorial conflicts, China remains one of India's most important trading partners.

The Anglo-Saxon nations of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States joined in September 2021 to form a strategic alliance called AUKUS. This coalition was formed to protect their mutual interests in the Indo-Pacific. China is worried because they see this as a threat to regional security and an acceleration of the arms race.

Australia's first nuclear-powered submarines will be developed with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, and Russia as part of the AUKUS alliance. The United States has been supplying the United Kingdom with cutting-edge technologies for almost 50 years, and this partnership builds on that tradition. Along with bolstering military cooperation in electronic warfare, cyber warfare, and artificial intelligence, AUKUS declared in April 2022 that it would hasten the development of cutting-edge hypersonic and anti-hypersonic weapons. These initiatives attempt to keep up with China and Russia, which have recently become more assertive militarily. Solomon Island's agreement with Beijing has a massive blow to the idea of Australia's regional power (Kumar, Sastry, Moonesar, & Rao, 2022, p. 5).

Unrestricted Global Warfare

Redefining China and Russia as main adversaries of the United States, separate from the focus on international terrorism, the White House under President Trump announced a revamped National Security Strategy in December 2017. This new approach, dubbed "Great Power Competition (GPC)," was developed to modernize the country's arsenals and fortify its status as the leading force in the world. When protecting American businesses, lowering trade imbalances, and establishing strategic political negotiations in the technological and geopolitical sectors, the Trump administration has engaged in a full-blown trade war with many countries. The policy, summed up in the phrase "America first," contributed to economic difficulties in nations like Cuba, Venezuela, and Iran.

The trade war has shown the United States and the Global North to be vulnerable and limited in their ability to preserve their position as global leaders. It reflected the collapse of American economic strength and the weakening of technology monopolies in the Global North. There has been a substantial trade deficit between the United States and China since 1999, although the gap in technological superiority between the two countries is closing. It is primarily due to China's Made in China 2025 initiative, presented in 2015. The dominance of North American tech titans has been challenged by Chinese businesses such as Huawei, which has emerged as a global leader in sectors like telecoms and patents. Due to the shifting dynamics, the global economy, including the allocation of labour and social structures, will require significant restructuring.

Trump renounced participation in global agreements like the TPP and TTIP, central to globalist geo-strategies aimed at containing China, Russia, and growing Eurasian countries. This choice appeased the less competitive industrial sector. However, it harmed relations with friends and neighbours, especially in the Asia-Pacific area, and made it harder to develop the global economy in a way that benefited economic and national security.

Despite efforts to delegitimize China through trade war policies, the country has become an important economic and industrial centre. Regarding industrial output, it rivals the economies of the United States, Germany, and Japan. The trade war has affected China, despite the country's continued dominance in fields including telecommunications, 5G, artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, and renewable energy technologies. China is ahead of the U.S. in several industries, and the distance between American tech titans (GAFA) and their Chinese rivals (BATX) is shrinking yearly (Merino G. E., 2022, p. 114).

A "chip war" between the United States and China is a growing concern among analysts due to rising tensions over technology issues. Vice President Joe Biden's administration has seen a surge in these disputes (Miller, 2022, p. 10). The United States government made headlines on October 7, 2022, when it banned the export of semiconductors for constructing supercomputers and artificial intelligence to China. The Science and CHIPS Act, which includes a $52 billion program to support the domestic semiconductor industry, is a $280 billion program passed in July 2022 (Kelly, 2022). This legislation is consistent with the goal to counter China’s growing dominance in the field of technology.

After years of investment, Beijing has set aside $150 billion to develop China's semiconductor industry further. To prevent Beijing from achieving the maximum levels of technological capability, Washington's principal goal is to "decouple" critical economic sectors between China and the U.S. Beijing, on the other hand, is trying to wean itself off Western technologies and establish economic autonomy through homegrown innovation and the regionalization of key components of the supply chain. The energy sector is working to lessen its reliance on fossil fuels while boosting its usage of renewable energy sources. Priorities are set to restore regional seed trade in the agricultural sector, and the financial sector is taking steps to limit the weaponization of the U.S. dollar. The Chinese government plans to follow a path of "globalization with Chinese features" (Jabbour, Dantas, & Vadell, 2021, p. 91) in response to what it sees as intensifying U.S.-led containment attempts.

The United States and its allies have used the "New Cold War" as a geostrategic instrument to encourage other countries to join the United States in 2017 (Merino G., 2020, p. 71). Chinese technology companies like Huawei are the target of various anti-Chinese measures, including political and intellectual campaigns, military threats, economic restraints, and trade and investment blockades.

National security concerns, especially in the telecommunications and ICT sectors, are sometimes used as a justification against the dominance of multinational technology businesses. Traditional Western dominance in these industries has been challenged by the rise of Chinese companies looking to break into global markets.

There is also evidence these intelligence operations and media campaigns are being used internationally to foment instability at home. As part of a broader worldwide propaganda campaign, typically under human rights, the West has provoked situations threatening China's territorial integrity and exploiting them. The terms "Hong Kong 12," "Tibet," and "Xinjiang" all refer to distinct locations in China. In 2022, Beijing encountered difficulties as it tried to accommodate calls for greater local autonomy in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong. The situation was made worse by the independent government of Taiwan, which received strong support from the United States. Tensions rose when House Speaker Nancy Pelosi travelled to Taiwan that August.

Conclusion

The "New Cold War" concept developed in the media and among Western commentators in 2013 and 2014 in response to multiple factors such as the wars in Ukraine and Syria and the increasing strains in the Asia-Pacific region in the wake of China's growing influence in the region. The current international situation, however, cannot be reduced to a "New Cold War." It can be called either a "Hybrid and Fragmented World War” or a "Hybrid World War". The term "great power competition" accurately describes the rising level of competition for political and strategic clout among the world's many nations and regions.

"Hybrid World War" refers to a broader concept that includes conventional and irregular forms of conflict, such as the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia on Russian soil. The United States is creating a worldwide confrontation between China and Russia as its influence declines. Supporters of the crumbling unipolar globalist system and proponents of a new multipolar world order are at odds in this conflict. This complex struggle is exacerbated by many facets of the global capitalist system, including but not limited to the economy, technology, finance, business, information, psychology, and the virtual world. There are several fronts in the United States and China's geopolitical conflict, but the Asia-Pacific area is where the fight is being waged.

During this historical and geographical transition period in the global order, there has been a general trend toward more heated political and strategic disputes. This trend is driven by the strengthening of China and other developing states and the weakening of the Global North and Anglo-American power. Moreover, the prominence of Asia as the dominant continent of the 21st century is also a major factor in this development. To fully grasp the contemporary geopolitical scene, it is necessary to comprehend the attempts of powerful countries, especially the United States, to fight this ascent and adjust to the changing power dynamics. In contrast to the institutions formed during American dominance, the current struggle reflects the climax of conflicts between traditional forces and the formation of new institutions due to the shifting of the global power structure. Conflicts between various political and socioeconomic groups have contributed to the tense relationship between the United States and China. The contemporary geopolitical period, marked by heightened intensity within the Hybrid World War, has faced a worldwide pandemic, which has further hastened this transformative transition.

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