This paper provides a scholarly discourse on the lasting importance and theoretical complexity of the security dilemma in international relations. Taking inspiration from classical realism, neorealism, and social constructivism, it extrapolates the dual dimensions of the dilemma in terms of interpretation and response, signifying the process in which uncertainty and fear can enforce self-reinforcing spirals that lead to an arms race and mistrust among states. The paper further tries to evaluate how to mitigate or transcend the security dilemma through the mechanisms of offense-defence differentiation, mechanisms of signalling, and the evolution of interpersonal understanding among states. By comprehending the discourse around weapon categorization, reliability of signalling, ontological meaning for states, and trust formation, the paper challenges the fatalistic perceptions and proposes that agency, identity establishment, and joint security measures can decrease insecurity. Conclusively, the paper argues that the security dilemma is primarily escapable.