Abstract

This study aims to understand the rationale behind India's recent offensive approach against Pakistan. With the advent of new technologies, the conflict transformed where major wars converted into minor wars and sub-conventional warfare. Nevertheless, India introduced a new set of warfighting strategies to establish itself as a major military power in the South Asian region. The study concluded that in line with its ambitious plans, India conducted a surgical strike deep inside Pakistan's territory in February 2019, and tried to establish a new pattern of strategic engagement where sovereignty breach of nuclear-capable Pakistan will be a 'New-Normal' in India-Pakistan conflictual relations. Interestingly, India taking inspiration from the US and Israel, not only tried to introduce 'New-Normal' in order to alter the norms of sovereignty in South Asia but also went dangerously ahead of them and negated the entire logic of 'nuclear-deterrence' without considering the fact that no one including the US has ever tried to create 'New-Normal' in the situation of actual nuclear deterrence. Lastly and importantly, it is either 'Normal' to accept the logic of nuclear deterrence or 'Abnormal' to reject or negate it. Pakistan's befitting response made it clear that there is no space for the establishment of 'New-Normal' under a nuclear overhang.

Key Words

India and Pakistan, Surgical Strike, New-Normal, Conflict, Nuclear Deterrence, Sovereignty

Introduction

The enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan may be traced back to independence in 1947. The two South Asian states are involved in sharp opposition to each other at almost all forums and levels. The hostility developed into a venomous shape which is vividly seen in the context of major as well as minor wars, in addition to several border skirmishes, taking place in a routine manner. The fatal antagonistic relations are considered to be multifaceted in nature (Yousaf, 2018). Various sources of enmity are factors such as historical animosity between the two major communities of the subcontinent, the role of their respective political leaderships, and British failure to manage the partition in a peaceful and fair way (Cohen, 2004). The British mismanagement of the partition became one of the core reasons for differences between the two newly born states.

With the end of the British Raj, each property, from weaponry to money, down to the paper clip was to be divided. Nevertheless, the division of assets and, more specifically, the demarcation of borders gained a controversial status that can be witnessed in the shape of serious territorial disputes. British left hundreds of princely states to decide their fate to join India or Pakistan or remain independent, which resulted in one of the serious dilemmas of partitions. India, while enjoying the conventional military superiority over Pakistan based on British favoritism with respect to the distribution of military assets, implemented its expansionist agenda by forcedly annexing princely states. The fact is evident in the context of various aggressive military campaigns launched by India to annex princely states to maximize its territory, such as Kashmir and Junagadh in 1947 and Hyderabad in 1948 (Ogden, 2014). Nevertheless, the hostility between India and Pakistan from the very onset became structured in the Kashmir dispute (Ganguly, 2016).

Kashmir issue is considered to be the most significant factor in shaping the hostile relations (Lamb, 1991) that led to major as well as minor wars fought between the two neighboring states (Abbasi and Khan, 2019). The historical animosity and militarism led to the nuclearization of the South Asian region, which further complicated the nature of conflict dynamics in the region. Kenneth Waltz, a nuclear deterrence advocator, maintains that nuclear weapons ensure peace and stability among the countries. Nevertheless, the case of India-Pakistan challenges this aforementioned assumption to the extent that even after more than two decades of time since the overt nuclearization still, both rival states experience threat perception and arms racing pushed by a stern security dilemma. The phenomenon such as cross-border terrorism, continuous deterrent force modernization, the inclusion of newer technologies in states' inventories, and evolving force postures incline to refresh the imperatives of the classic security dilemma when the Asian rivals' fall into the trap of unresolvable arms racing problems (Khan, 2015).

Bidwai and Vanaik (1999) appropriately remarked the phrase, “South Asia on a Short Fuse”, to depict the severity of the situation among the nuclear-armed states which arose during the Kargil crisis in 1999. The applicability of phrase is much evident with respect to numerous crises situation that erupted in the post nuclear era. Notably, in recent times, the hostility intensified in the backdrop of patterns such as February 2019 episode (BBC, 2019). The violation of Pakistan's airspace by India's warplanes on to conduct, what India claimed, a surgical strike on militant camps, has stirred a flurry of media debates and political speculations in Pakistan and the world at large. For Pakistan, it was a clear breach of its 'Sovereignty' and a blatant challenge to its policy of 'minimum-credible-nuclear-deterrence' (Kaura, 2020). Questions have been raised as to what really prompted India to cross the red line and risk nuclear war with Pakistan? Critical analysis of the whole episode indicates that there is a methodology in India's adventurous, ambitious strategy. This paper aims to understand the rationale behind India's recent offensive approach with respect to the surgical strike stratagem. Under the qualitative research, the integrative review technique has been applied for the collection and analysis of the data, keeping in view the core objective of the article. 




Conflict Dynamics in Pre-Nuclear Era

The two states have fought numerous major and minor wars (1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999), experienced a series of crises, and routine border skirmishes since 1947 (Oxford Biographies, 2016). In order to ensure security against each other, both states inclined themselves towards extra-regional powers (Abbasi & Khan, 2019). For example, Pakistan perceived an existential threat from India's conventional superiority in the wake of the 1948 war and was forced to enter into alliances with great powers for the sake of survival. Pakistan signed Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955 (US Department of State Archive, 2009) and joined the American Bloc to maximize its security. On the other hand, India, in the Nehruvian era; towed the policy of nonalignment however was more suspicious of the US and expressed ambivalence towards the Soviet Union (Ganguly and Perdesi, 2009). However, in the later phase of the same era and more specifically in the aftermath of the Sino-Indo war in 1962, India underwent military modernization. It is pertinent to mention here that even after the death of Nehru, Indian policymakers were not in a position to publicly discard the nonalignment rhetoric but in practical terms, the policies were formulated and executed in the context of realist orientation (Ganguly and Pardesi).

India signed a strategic treaty with the Soviet Union in August 1971 that explicitly shattered its nonalignment philosophy (Ganguly and Pardesi). This Indian-Soviet treaty enhanced India's confidence to interfere in the East Pakistan crisis and further supported Mukti Bahini, ultimately led to the breakage of Pakistan and the subsequent creation of Bangladesh. Like India-Pakistan 1965 war, the US remained aloof and refrained from supporting Pakistan in 1971war (Jabeen and Mazhar, 2011). Historical analysis suggests that Pakistan's alliance with great powers, specifically the US, did not work for it, and the former's hope was dismayed during the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 (Jabeen and Mazhar). Further, the US imposed embargoes on Pakistan, which weakened its already deteriorated military capabilities. Whereas India implemented three consecutive defensive development plans, which assisted it to become the third-largest Army, fifth-largest Air force, and eighth-largest Navy in the world by 1977 (Jabeen and Mazhar, 2011).

The military modernization acted as an impetus to go for the adoption of offensive posture. India's army launched "Operation Meghdoot" at Siachen Glacier, involving massive mobilization of troops in spring 1984. Importantly, before India's offensive military endeavour, there was no permanent military stationing of any country (Khan, 2003). India airlifted a complete battalion to a conflict zone and gained control of the strategic mountains at the Siachen Glacier. Pakistan retaliated to India's adventurous action and mobilized its troops. However, India annexed almost 1000 square miles area by then which in fact was claimed by Pakistan to be part of its territory. Significantly, this India's aggression in Siachen became the very foundation for Pakistan's strategic compulsive response in the shape of the Kargil crisis in 1999 (Khan, 2018).

In the 1980s, India towed the plan of building a mechanized mobile force capable of striking preemptively and surgically in a swift manner deep inside Pakistan's territory (Ganguly, 2015). The aggressive plan was devised to prevent Pakistan from going nuclear in the wake of intelligence reports which indicated that the nuclear weapons research programme was at a fairly advanced stage (Ganguly, 2016). In order to analyze India's capability and Pakistan's response, Sunderji organized a massive military exercise in 1986, codenamed Brasstacks, in the Rajasthan desert along with India–the Pakistan border (Cohen, 2001). The exercise began in November 1986 and continued till mid-1987, creating fear and uncertainty in Pakistan regarding India's intentions to attack its nuclear facilities. Subsequently, the top Pakistani leadership clearly communicated to India that Pakistan will use the nuclear device if its existence and sovereignty are threatened (Aziz, 2015). Few scholars maintain that the phenomenon of nuclear deterrence averted the conflict escalation and made the two states to negotiate (Abbasi and Khan, 2019). Based in the offensive approach, General Sunderji again planned a similar military exercise in 1987, but this time against China, codenamed Checkerboard, at India-Bhutan-Arunachal Pradesh border tri-junction (Cohen, 2001). However, with the intervention of extra-regional powers such as the US and the Soviet Union, the exercise was called off (Ganguly, 2015). To sum up, India’s offensive military maneuvers created instability in the region. 

Within this backdrop, the Kashmir dispute once again emerged as a point of the clash between the two rivals. The uprising in Kashmir went to an all-time high in 1989. India blamed Pakistan for supporting Kashmiri people in creating unrest and violence, which India labeled as terrorism (Chalk, 2001). While Pakistan denied any such involvement and emphasized that it only extends moral support to the freedom fighters struggling for the cause of the right of self-determination. Interestingly, this phenomenon of India's allegation and Pakistan's denial steered the complex nature of conflict in the years to come (Ganguly, 2015).

Crisis Dynamics in Post-Nuclearization Era

The enduring rivalry even became more complex with the acquisition and demonstration of nuclear power. India in the first phase, conducted a nuclear test in 1974 (Gangly, 1983). In the second phase, India conducted additional tests in 1998; on 11th and 13th May and in compulsive response, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests on 28th and 30th May 1998 (Khan, 2015) to ensure its survival (Khan, 2016). However, in the immediate aftermath of nuclear tests, the eruption of the Kargil crisis challenged the theoretical assumption that nuclear armed states do not go to war. Nevertheless, the crisis was limited in scale and objectives that started in May and continued till July 1999 (Pervez, 2012). Broadly, two reasons are attributed to the occurrence of the Kargil crisis on Pakistan's part. Firstly, Pakistan responded to India's aggressive military intrusion of 1984(operation Meghdoot) with an aim to grab the strategic location of Kargil to gain a better position on negotiating table. Secondly, Pakistan used the phenomenon of nuclear deterrence to pressure India to come towards substantive dialogue, attention of the global community for Kashmir dispute, and to give a boost to freedom struggle (Abbasi and Khan, 2019). The great powers and, more significantly, the US played a significant role in defusing the tensions between the two nuclear-armed states (Yousaf, 2007). Importantly, India and Pakistan avoided any major or minor wars in the years to come; however, the relations between the enduring rivals remained tense due to terrorist acts across the borders.  

In 2001, five shooters entered in Indian Parliament and opened fire, killing more than a dozen people and injuring many (Khan and Abbasi, 2019). In a few months' time, another violent event took place where India's military base located in Kaluchak was assaulted by militants leaving a number of causalities (Khan, 2018). India blamed Pakistan-based extremist groups to be involved in conducting terrorist acts (Nayak and Krepon, 2006). 

These violent events, reckoned as Twin Peak Crisis, heightened tensions between nuclear-armed states (Krepon, 2006). India launched Operation Parakram involving large-scale military mobilization, and Pakistan responded in kind (Khan, 2016). The situation was not acceptable to the US in awe of war on terror as the tensions between India and Pakistan were diverting the latter's focus from the western to the eastern border (Abbasi and Khan, 2019). Once again, the US seeking its national interest came-up to the forefront and successfully deescalated the crisis in the nuclear-armed South Asia region (Nayak and Krepon, 2006). In order to end the crisis, the US acted as a guarantor of Pakistan's pledges to counter-terrorism and put pressure on the Pakistani government to take concrete steps against terrorist groups operating on its soil. After a long standoff that lasted for a period of about a year, India quietly withdrew its troops from the border.

Operation Parakram, launched initially to pressure Pakistan, failed to achieve its objectives due to severe limitations faced by the Indian Army during the troops' mobilization (Dasgupta and Cohen, 2011). The doctrinal limitations exposed during Operation Parakram led to massive debate within civil and military leadership, and emphasis was made to rethink and review military doctrine to overcome the shortcomings and subsequently formulate a new strategy. So, in 2004, India developed an ambitious Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) under a nuclear umbrella (Khattak, 2018) which brought considerable changes in the Indian military posture.

The new doctrine was observed to be parting its way from a traditional defensive posture. The doctrine restructured the Indian military and reorganized offensive strategic posture (Ludwig, 2007). CSD is a proactive active strategy involving quick mobilization of forces for the purpose of giving a severe blow to Pakistani forces to gain territory and further cutting the country into halves. The doctrine includes the conduct of limited conventional surprise attack and undertaking of offensive, preemptive operations short of a nuclear war that would conceal India's overall goals, which would not threaten Pakistan's destruction as a state; consequently, it would be refrained from using a nuclear weapon as a last resort weapon (Jaspal, 2019).

To counter India's offensive doctrinal shift, conventionally weaker Pakistan developed Nuclear Tactical Weapons (NTW) such as Nasr Missile Systems to deter rivals' superiority (Khan, 2013). However, it was evident that in case of any eventuality from India together with lack of de-escalation efforts from the international community, Pakistan will not be passive in defense but will rather react with escalatory punitive maneuvers of its own (Jones, 2004). In this very context, any mishaps, unintentional actions, and misperceptions in the crisis situation might happen in South Asia. Additionally, the agitators’ violent acts give supplementary impetus to create fear regarding the success of escalation control in South Asia (Krepon, 2006).

Nevertheless, the violence continued to occur with varying responses from India. Mumbai train attack in 2006 (BBC, 2015) and in the very next year, Samjhuta Express Bombings occurred (Sajid, 2021). The response from the Indian government was reckoned as muted in both instances. With a short stoppage of the dialogue process, both countries not only resumed talks but also signed an agreement on the formulation of a joint antiterrorism mechanism. This rationalistic approach assisted in the de-escalation of the crisis in the nuclear armed region. Nevertheless, the Mumbai attack that occurred in 2008 shocked the Indian government and further, the response was significantly higher in comparison to the previous two terrorist events.

Delhi faced increased pressure from within the state to act aggressively against terrorist outfits based in Pakistan, allegedly responsible for the perpetrated carnage. Pakistani government expressed goodwill to extend all-out support to India to bring perpetrators to justice(Nayak and Krepan, 2012). Pakistan took practical actions by detaining the suspects and subsequently putting them on trial. The dissatisfied Indian government launched a strong diplomatic and media campaign to pressure Pakistan to act against terrorist sanctuaries based in its territory. However, this approach is considered to be fundamentally adapted to restrain the crisis, and indeed, it did not escalate (Khan, 2007)

Mumbai crisis did not eventually shoot up to the military conflict, in fact, there was a significant chance for South Asian rivals to learn lessons, but the matter of fact is that very few skills were gained in the context of crisis prevention mechanism. The lack of political will for the resolution of major disputes such as Kashmir, that have dangerous potential to spark crises at any time, draws attention towards the nonexistence of all-inclusive mechanism to lessen the nuclear threat (Khan, 2018). This fact is very much evident with respect to the violent events that took place in India in promoting the crisis like situation in the future. 

It is important to note that at the time when India was pushing Pakistan to act against militants, Pakistan was fighting a tough, successful battle against terrorist outfits internally. Further, the terrorist events such as the Marriott Hotel bombing (2008), the attack on Sri Lankan cricket team (2009), the attack on the Police training academy (2009), and more specifically, the attack on Peshawar school (2014) created a big blow on Pakistani psyche. Pakistan initiated major military operations, and in fact, its security situation later improved while terrorist attacks were effectively controlled and gradually prevented. However, terrorism yet remained a major challenge for overall stability in the region. The deadly attacks of Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota happened in 2016 were a greater setback to the peace in the region and increased mistrust and uncertainty between the rival states. The mistrust further increased with the arrest of a former Indian Naval officer, turned a spy, Kulbhushan Jadhav, who was operating in Baluchistan and publicly confessed on television for promoting sabotage in Karachi (The Wire, 2017). More specifically and lately, the Pulwama incident and subsequent risky episode occurred in February 2019 endangered the risk of a major war between the nuclear armed states (Khan, 2019). Importantly and in contrast with the previous instances, India conducted a surgical strike stratagem against Pakistan, an offensive military action first of its kind since 1971 but this time under a nuclear overhang.

India’s Offensive Surgical Strikes Stratagem: Methodology in Madness

Historical analysis suggests that nuclear deterrence significantly shrunk the scale of violence (Mearsheimer, 1993). Since the end of the Cold War, India and Pakistan is the only antagonistic pair of nuclear-armed states which consistently created a worrisome situation for the world (Yousaf, 2007). There is much to learn for both nuclear rivals from the patterns that evolved during the Cold War, where great powers devised and exercised various methods and mechanisms to avoid military escalation (Khan, 2016). In contrast, South Asian rivals are involved in direct/ indirect confrontations quite capable of risking the strategic stability in the region. In fact, the phenomenon of nuclear deterrence assisted in the prevention of major war/s between the archrivals, but the occurrence of minor war/s and/ or adoption of sub-conventional strategies are still not out of the question and, indeed, challenged the very nature of deterrence. 

India's doctrinal shift brought transformation in its dealing with militancy. In the past, India used to blame Pakistan on the occurrence of terrorist events and further publically and diplomatically pressurized Pakistan to act against the extremist outfits. Moreover, at times massive mobilization of troops was witnessed during such scenarios. Nevertheless, India's response to any violent event that happened in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) or elsewhere in India changed and can be observed in the shape of a surgical strike stratagem. Importantly, how and who will determine that terrorists are Pakistan based and/ or have a connection with the Pakistani state, as there are instances where the source of terrorism was found to be linked to the internal dynamics of India (Khan, 2015-16). Without catering this into account, India implemented its new offensive strategy and conducted a surgical strike stratagem in recent years.

In the first instance, in the aftermath of the Uri incident in which 19 soldiers were killed, India blamed Pakistani-based extremist groups for the perpetrated carnage. India claimed to conduct a surgical strike across the Line of Control (LOC) in the middle of the night between 28th and 29th September in 2016 targeting terrorist camps (Gokhale, 2017). However, Pakistan denied any such kind of surgical strike on its side of the LOC in Jammu and Kashmir (Masood & Ashraf, 2019). In the second instance, in adoption to same offensive philosophy, India conducted an aerial surgical strike at Balakot deep inside Pakistan's territory on February 26, 2019 (Jaspal, 2019). India claimed that the surgical strike was targeted against the training camp of Jaish-e-Muhammad, a terrorist outfit based in Pakistan that accepted the responsibility of terrorist attack at Pulwama in IOK on February 14, 2019, killing about forty troops.

Pakistan rejected the Indian narrative; and instead, retaliated by adopting the well-established conventional norms of engagement which have been evolved over the years and in accordance with the United Nations (UN) charter with respect to defending the sovereignty of a state in such a desperate situation. Pakistan immediately rejected the Indian narrative diplomatically and publically; and offered to extend all-out support in investigation and further reiterated to act against the perpetrators based in authentic evidence. However, India denied any such support and further continued to blame Pakistan based non-state actors for the terrorist acts (Mansoor and Ashraf, 2019). In a "tit-for-tat" manner, Pakistan retaliated in such a desperate situation by locking and hitting Indian military targets and shooting down Indian fighter jet and further capturing one pilot. Pakistan responded for the purpose of signaling adversary to avoid indulging in over-ambitious strategy (Mansoor & Ashraf).

Pakistan released captured Indian pilot as a goodwill gesture for peace on March 1, 2019, which in fact assisted in restraining the crisis. Nevertheless, India continued to adopt offensive philosophy and deployed its Naval Submarine to enter into Pakistani territory on March 4, 2019 (Jaspal, 2019). It appears that Pakistan in 2016 as well as in 2019 responded rationalistically to avoid risk of nuclear war. On the other hand, it was India who initiated the gallop and was unpredictable with respect to its behavioral patterns. Interestingly, India’s evolving adventurous approach in line with its offensive strategy emerged in the shape of surgical strikes. This depicts India’s intention to establish a new pattern of engagement in South Asian geostrategy under the nuclear overhang (Jaspal, 2019). 

In this regard, the important questions to be looked in are how India could demonstrate deliberate ignorance towards international laws and norms that provide assurance to the phenomenon of state’s sovereignty? More significantly, if a state like Pakistan, whose sovereignty is violated is internationally recognized nuclear state, than this blatant disregard of its sovereignty challenge not only the nuclear deterrence logic but also it contradicts the conformist patterns of wisdom and shared international understanding on which the standards or rules of strategic engagements between nuclear-capable states are based upon. A critical analysis of the situation suggests that there is methodology in the madness of India's proactive adventurous ambitious surgical strike stratagem. India conducted a surgical strike as a means to establish 'New-Normal' where sovereignty breach of nuclear armed countries such as Pakistan will be considered as a new reality in South Asian geopolitics.

Importantly, the surgical strikes stratagem so-called 'New-Normal' was adopted by the US and Israel and practically made it part of their strategic policies to gain their respective objectives in the Middle East and Africa. This phenomenon of surgical strikes came into force, principally in the wake of 9/11 terrorist event and the subsequent war on terror (Burra, 2020). The US and Israel using the mantra of war on terror justified the surgical strikes as a tactic and violated the conventional norms of sovereignty of the states. The US and Israel, with the support of sophisticated military and technological power, transformed the ‘Abnormal Act’ of breaching the states sovereignty into ‘New-Normal’ and it afterwards became the established pattern in the regional geostrategy and geopolitics.

The US and Israel considered the targeted states, either incapable or reluctant to conduct operations against the terrorist outfits which were allegedly operating from their respective territories and serving as proxies for other powers. Based on this self-conceived and self-constructed rationale, the US and Israel have repetitively violated the international laws and norms that guarantee the state-sovereignty, thus establishing the pattern of ‘New-Normal’ or ‘New-Realities’ in the international politics where sovereignty is no longer considered unbreachable.

Keeping in view the establishment of ‘New-Normal’ in the Middle East, India followed the US and Israel strategy in South Asia particularly to establish itself as a hegemon in the region. However, India went dangerously ahead of them as it negated the entire logic of ‘nuclear-deterrence’ without considering the fact that the US remained extreme cautious with respect to its ‘New-Normal Strategy’ in the situation of actual nuclear deterrence between two or more than two sides. In its misplaced belief to introduce ‘New-Normal’, India on 26th February not only breached Pakistan’s state sovereignty but also shook the theoretical and practical foundation of nuclear deterrence logic.

Consequently, Pakistan in a "tit-for-tat" manner retaliated to India's 'New-Normal', by locking and hitting Indian military targets and shooting down Indian fighter jet. Pakistan followed the well-established conventional norms of engagement which have been evolved over the years and are in accordance with the United Nations (UN) charter. Pakistan acted 'Normal' to defend the sovereignty of a state in such a desperate situation. Further, Pakistan's befitting response made it clear that there is no space for establishment of 'New-Normal' under a nuclear overhang. To conclude, it is either 'Normal' to accept the logic of nuclear deterrence or 'Abnormal' to reject or negate it. The policymakers in India and Pakistan in particular and the world community at large need to make joint efforts at bilateral and multilateral levels to avoid any such mishaps which can result in inadvertent escalation.     

Conclusion

The advent of nuclear weapons in 1998 significantly altered the geostrategic patterns and further, transformed the nature of conflict between India and Pakistan. The massive modernization of conventional capabilities together with ever increasing stockpiles and relevance of deterrent forces provided the necessary foundation for innovation in war-fighting strategies to gain escalation dominance. In fact, numerous crises occurred in the post-nuclearization era but not a single event converted into a major war. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of nuclear deterrence could not diminish the prospects of limited war or sub-conventional warfare. The introduction of nuclear weapons and transformation in states' doctrinal strategies led to change the character and nature of war between the two states. For example, the conflict dynamics have shifted from major and minor wars to insurgencies and phenomenon of surgical strikes. 

In the last few years, in line with its ambitious doctrinal changes to gain hegemonic status in the South Asian region, India conducted surgical strike deep inside Pakistan's territory in February 2019 as it tried to establish a new pattern of strategic engagement where sovereignty breach of nuclear-capable Pakistan will be a 'New Normal'. The study concluded that India taking inspiration from the US and Israel not only tried to introduce ‘New-Normal’ in order to alter the norms of sovereignty in South Asia but also went dangerously ahead of them and negated the entire logic of ‘nuclear-deterrence’ without considering the fact that no one including the US has ever tried to create ‘New-Normal’ in the situation of actual nuclear deterrence. Lastly and importantly, it is either ‘Normal’ to accept the logic of nuclear deterrence or ‘Abnormal’ to reject or negate it. Pakistan’s befitting response made it clear that there is no space for establishment of ‘New-Normal’ under a nuclear overhang.  

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